Most cultural commentators approach diversity from a different point of view. They focus less on individual choice and more on whether various cultures "look the same." We can distinguish between diversity as a menu of choice and diversity as cultural distinctiveness. When an artwork is traded from one society to another, the menu of choice commonly becomes richer, as the new importing consumers have more choices. But cultural distinctiveness may go down, as the two societies become more alike. Consumers can now buy French cheese, sushi, and Mexican food in either France or Germany. This makes France and Germany more alike and less distinct, but it also widens the menu of choice in both countries.
Drawing upon economic reasoning, we see these developments as positive, not a cause for concern. In some regards the world was very diverse in 1450, yet few people enjoyed much of this diversity. Tomatoes were available in Mexico but not in Italy. In contrast, today's consumers might have a Japanese stereo, a German car, cook from Chinese recipes, and buy Persian rugs and Mexican rap music. Rather than bringing a culture of the least common denominator, markets decrease the costs of serving consumer tastes, whether common or not.
II. Do Trade and Globalization Damage
Distinctiveness?
Cultural distinctiveness might be a public good, or for some ethical or aesthetic reason it could be a merit good. Increasing returns to specialization intensify regional distinctiveness on the production side. In these models the larger the size of the international market, the more regions specialize. Thus, Hollywood produces more movies, but Paris produces more new fashions. Consumption patterns may become more distinctive across borders as well. Regions differ in basic endowments, for reasons of climate, geography, and history. The spread of a common technology interacts with these endowments in unique ways. So the guitar gives us flamenco music in Spain, rock and roll in the United States, and meringue music in the Dominican Republic. Trade can make basic technologies more similar, but neither convergence in production nor convergence in consumption is implied.
One possible mechanism for a diversity decline comes from Sherwin Rosen's (1981) "superstars" hypothesis. In this account, a reproducible technology centralizes market returns. Rather than hearing a live singer at the local nightclub, recording allows music fans to buy the "best" vocalist and hear higher-quality singing on disc. In this case the total number and kind of singers can decline, thus damaging diversity. Note, however, that the superstar hypothesis can improve market diversity as well. When fans disagree about which singer is the best, recording technology allows many more singers to reach broader audiences and thus make a living. Again, the larger the size of the potential market, the easier it is to cover fixed costs of production. As a matter of empirical fact, the music market became much more diverse, following the advent of recording and radio. ' Finally, market exchange typically supports individual distinctiveness, even when it decreases distinctiveness across larger societal units. Markets allow individuals to pursue more varied consumption patterns. Collectors of Mexican artworks come from around the world, as do fans of The Lord of the Rings, which is the product of British, Germanic, and Nordic myths. Rather than saying that trade has destroyed diversity, trade has liberated diversity from the constraints of borders and geography. Compare this development to poorer and more isolated societies. Each tribe might have a different music, but everyone within a given tribe will hear and perform the same music. Distinctiveness across tribes will be high, but distinctiveness within a given tribe will be very low. Yet if distinctiveness has intrinsic or external benefits, we might wish to extend the choice of cultural distinction to all individuals within a given area. Such a recommendation would point us in the direction of globalization and trade, not isolation and protection.
III. Some Evidence from the Arts
We find a greater menu of choice in a wide variety of cultural settings, as illustrated by a contemporary book or music superstore. Or consider some simple numbers. Between 1450 and 1500, about 10,000-15,000 titles were published. By 1962, 250,000 titles each year were being published in the world, and the number has continued to rise (Gabriel Zaid, 2003 Decentralized production has been less pronounced in the case of movies. Most of the movies viewed in the world come from Hollywood, Bollywood, or to a lesser extent Hong Kong. In Europe, Hollywood market share is frequently above 80 percent. For whatever reason, it appears that movies are produced more efficiently from a clustered geographic center (Cowen, 2002) . European and other global talents then tend to congregate in this center rather than working in the home nation. This tendency makes it harder for each country to have a commercially healthy movie sector of its own.
Languages are arguably the strongest exception to the robustness of distinctiveness at the macro level. The number of living languages is plummeting as speakers move into the major linguistic groups of English, Spanish, Chinese, Arabic, and others. The benefits of a common language outweigh the desire to remain separate, as is typical in network models. That being said, common languages ease the communication of cultural ideas. In this regard overall cultural diversity can rise as linguistic diversity falls.
The broader history of mankind shows that periods of growing wealth, commerce, and trade are correlated with artistic and creative productivity (Cowen, 1998 Political beliefs tend to be "ration nal" (Caplan, 2001 (Caplan, , 2002 . Econo long recognized that false political t little or no personal cost. These inc widely thought, under the rubric ( ignorance," to prompt political apath beliefs also take the form of dogmat ate commitment to palpable error. f many people angrily oppose foreign than admitting that they know too li an opinion. As any teacher of Ecoi should know, some irrational comr more popular than others.
Along these lines, critics of globa prematurely certain that culture is and they greet conflicting evidence ity rather than curiosity. We see a divide between individuals' politi tions and their private behavior. Thn pie who criticize cultural trade s Internet, talk on cell phones, fly to fc tries, wear sneakers, and eat fast democratic mechanism translates nally irrational beliefs about politics (Caplan, 2003 
C. Biases against Foreigners
Belief differences between economists and the general public are especially strong concerning foreigners. The American public believes that excessive foreign aid and loss of jobs to foreigners are among our biggest economic problems. Virtually all economists, regardless of their political views, know better. These systematic biases are large for quantitative questions as well. When asked to identify the two largest components of the federal budget, foreign aid was Americans' single most common response (Caplan, 2002) . Now what would a person suffering from anti-foreign bias tend to think about culture? He would overrate the importance of his national culture and underrate the contributions of other countries and regions. He would neglect the importance of cultural exchange and exaggerate the case for protectionism. The more successfully a foreign competitor infiltrates his national 3 Note the following paradox. If diversity is a value more generally, we might be tempted to conclude that diversity over time is a value as well. But many critics of globalization decry the passing of previous cultures and implicitly stake out an opposition to intertemporal diversity. Why should atemporal diversity be so good and intertemporal diversity be so bad? market, the stronger the impulse to vilify it as junk.4
Hostility to cultural globalization thus stems partly from the more general anti-foreign bias. Indeed, if "foreign steel" and "foreign cars" are appealing scapegoats, "foreign culture" is better still. Steel and cars are only "foreign" in the sense that foreigners made them. Foreign culture is alien in a stronger sense: they are trying to turn us into them. As private individuals, of course, we often like becoming a bit more like them, but as voters, many people find this possibility repellent.
V. Conclusion
Trade and competition are, for the most part, misunderstood but beneficent cultural forces. No great culture has arisen in isolation; all owe their existence to the international economy. Consumer choice (the most relevant measure of cultural diversity) is expanding, not shrinking. Cultural competition is not without losers, but selective attrition, "cultural downsizing," is a significant engine of future cultural growth. None of this denies the possible existence of cultural market failures. But, as the rent-seeking literature teaches us, every loser has a story about why it would be better "for society as a whole" if the rules of the game were different. Since the public readily accepts some unconvincing stories at face value, the economics profession should examine those stories with due skepticism.
